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ABSTRACT
This article rethinks the meaning of the 1943 Barnette case and questions the canonical
status of Justice Robert Jackson’s famous opinion for the majority. On the assumption
that we have lost sight of the logic that had been used to uphold compulsory flag salute
laws, the article traces the many state court opinions on this topic prior to World War
II. Also brought under scrutiny is Jackson’s usage of the term “totalitarian” to describe
flag salute laws, a quasi-theological term promoted first and foremost by the Jehovah’s
Witnesses. Jackson’s opinion in Barnette, while rhetorically compelling, was out of
sync with his own First Amendment jurisprudence as a whole. Finally, the article
highlights overlooked strengths of Justice Felix Frankfurter’s dissent in Barnette,
notably his defense of state jurisdiction on the basis of epistemic pluralism. What
makes Barnette a truly great case is not the often quoted passages in Jackson’s opinion
but the complex interchange between Jackson and Frankfurter about the nature of
democracy and judicial review.
AUTHOR’S NOTE
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“ . . . [N]o single principle can answer all of life’s complexities.” 1
I. DEMYTHOLOGIZING BARNETTE - AN OVERVIEW
What is now required is the “stiff-arm” salute, the saluter to keep the
right hand raised with palm turned up.2
Therefore, be it RESOLVED, that the West Virginia Board of
Education does hereby recognize and order that the commonly
accepted salute to the Flag of the United States–the right hand is
placed upon the breast and the following pledge repeated in unison:
“I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and
to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all”–now becomes a regular part of the
program of activities in the public schools.3

T

he two quotations immediately above are not profound in
themselves, but being in contradiction with each other, they have
profound implications. They purport to describe the same thing: the flag
salute examined in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.
The contradiction has not been observed by scholars before, and I wish
to suggest that attending to such granular historical details can improve,
and indeed transform, our understanding of Justice Robert H. Jackson’s
celebrated majority opinion in this case.
Jackson described the gesture as a “a stiff-arm” salute, and in a
footnote, he highlighted its similarity to the Nazi salute of Hitler. 4
Jackson’s is also the first Supreme Court opinion in which the word
“totalitarian” is mentioned,5 a fact central to one of the arguments in this
article: Jackson did not regard the compulsory flag salute as
unconstitutional merely because it violated the conscience of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses; he found it unconstitutional because it violated his
own political conscience, his own fear of the threat of totalitarianism.
Jackson was clearly speaking in his own voice, and not merely relaying
the religious views of the Witnesses, when he stated:
Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson
of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity
as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to
religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to
1
2
3
4
5

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 628 (1943).
Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
Id. at 628 n.3.
This can be verified through a word search in all Supreme Court cases in Westlaw Campus
Research.
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Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present
totalitarian enemies.6

Jackson’s famous opinion reflected his deep concern that American
soil was fertile ground for the growth of fascism. His description of the
flag salute as resembling the hailing of Hitler served to strengthen his
claim that the compulsory flag salute is intrinsically dictatorial in
nature. No previous court took this position. Notably, in the circuit court
opinion which Barnette affirmed, holding that the compulsory flag
salute violated the free exercise of religion and requiring an
accommodation for the Witnesses, Judge Parker stated, “[t]here is, of
course, nothing improper in requiring a flag salute in the schools.” 7 In
contrast, Jackson believed that “[t]hose who begin coercive elimination
of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.” 8
However, the straight-arm salute was not actually used in West
Virginia schools when the Barnette case was decided. Jackson himself
referred to the Board of Education’s resolution in a footnote. As
described in the resolution, the hand is held upon the chest and is not
extended.9 The same description of the salute is featured in the
Appellee’s Brief.10 Jackson described the pledge as more Hitlerian than
it really was.11
With this fact on the table, I will pose a question to readers who have
a basic familiarity with Barnette, a case which is usually required
reading in Constitutional Law courses. How well do we understand this
case? Consider the possibility that a case can become so iconic that we
cease studying it and merely celebrate it. Is this not particularly true
when a case contains moving passages–words so beautiful that we
extricate them from the complexities of the debate in which the case was
embedded? At that point, where a case is known primarily through dicta
6
7
8
9
10
11

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D. W. Va. 1942).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
See id. at 626, n.2.
Appellees’ Brief at 5, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No.
591), 1943 WL 71856 [hereinafter Barnette Appellees’ Brief].
Both West Virginia and Congress had abolished the straight-arm salute before 1943. On
December 22, 1942, a House Joint Resolution established that the pledge “is rendered by
standing with the right hand over the heart.” HR.J Res. 359, 77th Cong § 7, 56 Stat. 1074,
1077 (1942). Jackson himself quoted this new version of the pledge, with no arm extension,
in Barnette to suggest that for Congress, the salute was not compulsory. Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 624 n.17. On this point he was correct, for Sec. 7 states that civilians may show full
respect for the flag “by merely standing at attention, men removing the headdress.” HR.J
Res. 359 § 7. Jackson scored a point in favor of granting exemptions to the salute, but he
inadvertently contradicted his earlier description of the pledge as a stiff-arm salute. For a
clear itemization of all modifications of the pledge in 1942, see 36 U.S.C § 172 (1959).
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hovering above history, critical thinking tends to go on vacation. To
make this point more clearly, as another scholar already did twenty
years ago when writing, “[a]lthough we praise Barnette, we have not
understood it,”12 let us consider four basic questions to test our
understanding.
A. Question 1 – What is our contextual understanding of
Barnette?
Off the top of your head, what year was Brown v. Board of
Education decided? This you certainly know: 1954. You probably also
know that Plessy v. Ferguson, upholding racial segregation, was around
1890 (1896, to be exact). In other words, you are aware that there was a
discrete historical era, from around 1890 to 1954, of judicially
sanctioned racial segregation, which Brown overturned, thus beginning
a new era of vitality for the Equal Protection Clause. Can you frame
Barnette in any comparable context? What year was the case? I imagine
you are not so sure, and you are not alone. In an essay called The
Supreme Court’s Five Greatest Moments, an eminent law professor
ranked Jackson’s opinion in Barnette as number one.13 Of course, he did
not fail to quote the most famous passage:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.14

But he also gave the wrong year, 1942, for the case. It was decided
in 1943. Only a year off, it is true, but it is hard to imagine an article
stating that Brown was in 1953. This is a sign of how decontextualized
Barnette has become in the legal imagination. Other questions
concerning chronology will tend to draw a blank, such as: when was the
Pledge of Allegiance composed, and when did the flag salute become a
requirement in American public schools? Has not Barnette been
lionized in a vacuum?

12
13

14

Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of
the First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 255 (2000).
Cass R. Sunstein, Cass Sunstein: U.S. Supreme Court’s Top 5 Opinions of All Time, TULSA
WORLD (June 7, 2015), https://tulsaworld.com/archive/cass-sunstein-u-s-supreme-courtstop-5-opinions-of-all-time/article_3c9696c0-f3b7-573f-8db4-49e65460deb5.html
[https://perma.cc/7ENS-NWRE].
Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
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B. Question 2 – Prior to Barnette, how did the Supreme Court
and other courts adjudicate cases about the compulsory
flag salute?
When I took a first-year course in Constitutional Law, 15 here is what
the editors of the required casebook wrote in their introduction to an
extract from Barnette: “[t]he first constitutional challenge arose in
Minersville, Pennsylvania, when William and Lilian Gobitis were
expelled from school for refusing to comply with the school board’s
requirement to salute the flag.”16
However, in the 1940 case referred to here, Minersville School
District v. Gobitis, Justice Frankfurter noted that there had previously
been “several per curiam dispositions of this Court” concerning flag
salute laws.17 And in his dissent in Barnette, which overturned Gobitis,
Frankfurter wrote:
I am fortified in my view of this case by the history of the flag salute
controversy in this Court. Five times has the precise question now
before us been adjudicated. Four times the Court unanimously found
that the requirement of such a school exercise was not beyond the
powers of the states. Indeed in the first three cases to come before
the Court the constitutional claim now sustained was deemed so
clearly unmeritorious that this Court dismissed the appeals for want
of a substantial federal question. In the fourth case the judgment of
the district court upholding the state law was summarily affirmed on
the authority of the earlier cases. The fifth case, Minersville District
v. Gobitis, was brought here because the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ran counter to our rulings.
They were reaffirmed after full consideration, with one Justice
dissenting.18

Frankfurter points to four constitutional challenges prior to
Minersville which reached the Supreme Court.19 There were also several
state court decisions on the constitutionality of the compulsory flag
15
16
17
18
19

I hasten to add, I am not a lawyer and did not receive a J.D. The M.S.L. at the Yale Law
School is a one-year program.
PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING CASES AND
MATERIALS 1481 (4th ed. 2000).
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 592 (1940) (holding that states may require
students in public schools to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 664 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
But see William A. Elias, Jr., The Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases, 16 U. KAN. CITY L. REV.
140, 145 n.28 (1948). Elias actually says there were more: “Prior to the Gobitis decision
there had been five Supreme Court decisions which allowed flag salute regulations to stand.
These cases were: Leoles v. Landers, 302 U.S. 656 (1937); Hering v. State Board of
Education, 303 U.S. 624 (1938); Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306 U.S. 621 (1939); and
Johnson v. Deerfield, 306 U.S. 621 (1939), rehearing denied 307 U.S. 650 (1939).” Id.
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salute, decisions that did not reach the Supreme Court. In short, there
were numerous constitutional challenges before Gobitis.
The question of prior adjudication is significant. For it is one thing
to believe that Barnette overruled only one previous case (Gobitis), and
yet another thing to ponder Frankfurter’s dissent, suggesting that
Barnette overturned something close to a judicial consensus that
compulsory flag salute laws are constitutional. The historical
significance of Barnette–the extent to which it represents a kind of
Kuhnian “paradigm” shift in American thinking about public schools,
civic ceremonies, democracy, legislative power, and the First
Amendment–has been underestimated.
We cannot assess the merits of Jackson’s arguments in Barnette
without an inventory of the arguments that had accumulated in support
of the constitutionality of the flag salute. Admittedly, Frankfurter’s
dissent in Barnette is a grand summation, and extension, of those
arguments. But we may wonder how attentive current-day scholars are
to a dissent against a majority opinion that “has received universal
adulation”20; a dissent which defends “one of the most infamous
decisions [Gobitis] in the Court’s history . . . often mentioned in the
company of Dred Scott v. Sanford and Plessy v. Ferguson”21; a dissent
written by someone whom Judge Richard A. Posner described (in my
opinion, mistakenly) as “brilliant but not thoughtful” and utterly unable
to “understand why any American would refuse to salute the American
flag.”22
C. Question 3 – What were Frankfurter’s principal arguments
in Gobitis, where he wrote for the majority and in Barnette,
where he dissented?
The question is important because what makes Barnette a truly great
Supreme Court case is not its memorable passages but the complex
interchange between Jackson and Frankfurter about the nature of
democracy and judicial review. The two justices also differed in their
conceptions of public education. Frankfurter was by no means willing
to rubber stamp any piece of democratically enacted legislation. But as
we will see, he considered civic education, the formation of citizens with
a sense of common identity, as essential for social cohesion. This meant
20

21
22

Bybee, supra note 12, at 254-55, n.15 (discussing a series of scholars praising Jackson’s
opinion in Barnette as a “landmark”, “among the great paeans to human liberty”, “among
the most eloquent pronouncements ever on First Amendment freedoms”, etc.)
Id. at 253 (footnotes omitted).
Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519,
530 (2012).
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that the preferences of parents had to sometimes be disregarded. In a
striking formulation in Gobitis, a formulation reminiscent of the French
idea of educational laicity,23 he wrote, “[w]e are dealing here with the
formative period in the development of citizenship . . . . What the school
authorities are really asserting is the right to awaken in the child’s mind
considerations as to the significance of the flag contrary to those
implanted by the parent.”24 Contra Posner, Frankfurter actually stated
that he was personally inclined to exempt conscientious objectors from
the flag salute.25 Still, he could not discern a constitutional right for
Jehovah’s Witnesses to exempt themselves from a facet of the public
educational system that had not been designed to discriminate against
them. In his Barnette dissent, he referred to the Scopes case as an
instance of some parents taking offense at the teaching of biology
because it contradicts the biblical account of creation.26 Considering that
the Appellee’s brief in Barnette argued that students had a right to be
exempt from classes in bookkeeping, grammar, domestic science, and
geography,27 Frankfurter had a rational basis for questioning the
majority in Barnette.
The principle of interpretation that I propose we adopt toward
Barnette is to see it as a very close decision, not a slam-dunk victory for
the six who made up the majority. Frankfurter’s views were plausible
and need to be examined with an open mind. Likewise, the orthodox
veneration of Jackson as a free speech libertarian also needs to be reexamined, which leads to my last question.

23

24

25

26
27

See generally Daniel Gordon, Why Is There No Headscarf Affair in the United States?, 34
HIST. REFLECTIONS, 37 (2008). There is vast scholarly literature on laicity and its
implications for public education in France. My own work on this topic explores the
banning of the headscarf and full veil in France by way of comparison with the United
States, where Barnette has been adduced against such bans. See also Peter Baehr & Daniel
Gordon, From the Headscarf to the Burqa: The Role of Social Theorists in Shaping Laws
Against the Veil, 42 ECON. AND SOC’Y, 249 (2013).
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598-99 (1940); see also W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 650, 654-55 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(discussing the school as a training ground for common citizenship and arguing that the
promotion of citizenship is a legitimate legislative end, and that a state may reasonably
believe the flag ceremony helps to achieve it).
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598 (“we might be tempted to say that the deepest patriotism is best
engendered by giving unfettered scope to the most crochety beliefs. Perhaps it is best . . .
to give to the least popular sect leave from conformities like those here in issue.”).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 659 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (referencing Scopes v. State, 289
S.W. 363, 363 (1926)).
Barnette Appellees’ Brief, supra note 10, at 46-47.
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D. Question 4 – What was Jackson’s understanding of free
speech?
It is well known that Jackson reframed the compulsory flag salute in
terms of free speech, although courts had previously approached it in
terms of freedom of religion. But what was his understanding of free
speech in general? His opinion in Barnette is often held up as an emblem
of our broad national commitment to free speech. A case in point is
Texas v. Johnson, holding that the burning of the flag is a protected form
of speech.28 In Johnson, no one was compelled to show ceremonial
respect for the flag; the question was whether one could desecrate it.
Yet, the Court cited Barnette to support the proposition that the
government was not just prohibited from compelling symbolic
expression, it could not even curtail it.29 In Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, the Court used Barnette to
support its ruling that students have a right to wear armbands in school
protesting the Vietnam War.30 These are classic libertarian free speech
cases, and Barnette is woven into them. But how does Barnette relate to
Jackson’s own free speech jurisprudence? In Barnette, he appears to
oppose all forms of governmentally compelled speech. After declaring
that the government cannot prescribe what shall be orthodox, or force
citizens to profess their belief therein, he added, “[i]f there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
us.”31
These are puzzling words from a justice who would later vote with
the majority to uphold a New York statute (the Feinberg Law), making
anyone who was a member of an organization advocating the overthrow
of the government by force ineligible for employment in public
schools.32 Another “exception” was Jackson’s concurring opinion in a
case in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a section of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 requiring officers in labor
unions to swear that they were not members of the Communist Party.
Jackson wrote, “[f]rom information before its several Committees and
from facts of general knowledge, Congress could rationally conclude
that, behind its political party facade, the Communist Party is a
conspiratorial and revolutionary junta, organized to reach ends and to

28
29
30
31
32

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
Id. at 401.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 n.2 (1969).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
See generally Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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use methods which are incompatible with our constitutional system.” 33
The idea that government cannot prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, known today as the “no compelled speech” doctrine, 34 is belied
by these cases. As for governmental proscription of speech, Jackson
supported prohibitions on what is today called “hate speech,” which he
called “group libel.” “Group libel statutes represent a commendable
desire to reduce sinister abuses of our freedoms of expression–abuses
which I have had occasion to learn can tear apart a society, brutalize its
dominant elements, and persecute, even to extermination, its
minorities.”35
As his opinions indicate, Jackson was not a free speech libertarian.
E. A Roadmap to Deeper Understanding
What, then, is the meaning of Barnette? What did Jackson believe?
How persuasive are his ideas when we examine them in the context of
debate with Frankfurter? The rest of this article consists of three
sections.
In Part II, I will examine the flag salute controversy in state court
decisions prior to Gobitis and Barnette. These decisions were virtually
unanimous in upholding the compulsory flag salute. Thus, we will gain
a better understanding of the “paradigm” that existed before dissensus
broke out in Gobitis, in which the two lower courts held in favor of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses. A key factor in producing this dissensus was the
new concept of “totalitarian” government. In Part III, I discuss the
advent of “totalitarianism” in constitutional discourse as well as
Jackson’s relationship to this concept, and how it influenced his First
Amendment jurisprudence. In Part IV, I revisit Frankfurter’s majority
opinion in Gobitis and his dissent in Barnette to restore a sense of the
close nature of the Barnette decision. I would not say that Barnette was
wrongly decided; I would say that it is wrong to think of the majority
opinion as a clear triumph of reason and liberty. While Jackson spoke
of certain principles as a “fixed star,” Frankfurter, with a more skeptical
33
34

35

Am. Commc’ns Ass’n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 424 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
Compare Richard F. Duncan, Defense Against the Dark Arts: Justice Jackson, Justice
Kennedy and the No-Compelled-Speech Doctrine, 32 REGENT U. L. REV. 265 (2020)
(celebrating the “no compelled speech” doctrine in Supreme Court decisions, from
Barnette to Masterpiece Cakeshop), with Genevieve Lakier, Not Such a Fixed Star After
All: West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, and the Changing Meaning of the
First Amendment Right Not to Speak, 13 FIU L. REV. 741 (2019) (taking a more critical
approach in analyzing and distinguishing Barnette from subsequent Court decisions resting
on the doctrine).
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 304 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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disposition, spoke of “difficulties and complexities.”36 Frankfurter’s
opinions in Gobitis and Barnette may well be “bad law,” but the
opinions must be preserved to appreciate the momentous debate that
took place.
II. THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY BEFORE GOBITIS AND
BARNETTE
To suggest that prior to Gobitis there was no constitutional dispute
over the flag salute37 is to imply that states and school districts acted
with impunity when they imposed the salute. Yet, the constitutionality
of the compulsory flag salute was adjudicated multiple times in state
courts. In all cases, the plaintiffs were Jehovah’s Witnesses, and in all
cases, the legal issue was whether compulsory flag salute regulations
violated religious freedom under the state and federal constitutions.
Nearly all cases, at both the trial and appellate level, were decided
against the Witnesses. I will examine some of these cases, but before
doing so, two other topics are worth addressing.
A. Law Journals Weigh in on Compulsory Flag Salutes in
Schools
An analysis of the earliest articles in law journals indicates that the
first academic comments generally supported the power of school
boards and state legislatures to make the salute and pledge
compulsory.38 Robert B. Gosline, in a 1936 article in the Law Journal
of the Student Bar Association [at] Ohio State University, observed that
“the courts will not interfere with the board of education’s exercise of
its discretionary powers to manage and control schools . . . unless such
exercise is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be an abuse of its

36
37
38

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 660 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See BREST ET AL., supra note 16, at 1481.
But see George K. Gardner & Charles D. Post, The Constitutional Questions Raised by the
Flag Salute and Teachers’ Oath Acts in Massachusetts, 16 B.U. L. REV. 803 (1936).
Although this is a notable exception, the argument here is complicated by the fact that the
Massachusetts General Court (i.e., the legislature) implemented both a flag salute
requirement and a requirement for all teachers at private and public educational institutions,
including colleges and universities, to take an oath of allegiance to the state and federal
constitutions. The article is directed primarily against the oath but does bring the flag salute
requirement into its ambit. Prior to 1938, legal comments generally supported flag
ordinances. Negative opinion on the compulsory flag broke out in 1938, stimulated most
likely by federal district court decision in Gobitis. See, e.g., Note, Compulsory Flag Salutes
and Religious Freedom, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1418, 1418-24 (1938).
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discretion.”39 As for the free exercise of religion, he wrote, “[p]ersonal
and private rights guaranteed by constitutions are not absolute.” 40
Gosline cited judicial support for laws restricting religious freedom:
laws against bigamy, laws against practicing medicine and fortune
telling without a license, and laws against vaccination exemptions for
school children attending public schools. The question concerning flag
ordinances is “whether they have sufficient relation to the public welfare
(education) to make them reasonable regulations and to keep them out
of the category of an unreasonable and arbitrary interference with a
personal liberty.”41 He did advise boards not to use coercion if they
could avoid it, in order to avoid a backlash which could “defeat their
own ends.”42 But Gosline concluded that “boards of education have the
power” to enforce the compulsory flag salute. 43
An example of an exception to the rule that early comments in law
journals regarded compulsory flag salute laws as constitutional can be
found in Marjorie Hanson’s 1936 article in the University of Pittsburgh
Law Review.44 Hanson states that a distinction should be drawn
“between a prohibition against conduct dangerous to public health and
morals, and the requirement of a positive act in violation of religious
scruples.”45 She doubts that there is a “right to compel performance of
an act which is contrary to religious beliefs, unless absolutely necessary
for the general welfare.”46 Thus, she cites a California case holding that
a pupil, whose parents objected to dancing for religious reasons, should
be exempt from participating, even though it was part of the course of
physical education.47 In spite of this, Hanson concludes that the ultimate
weakness of flag regulations in Pennsylvania stems from the fact that
they were enacted by local school boards in the absence of state-wide
legislation. If the legislature “sanctioned the means used to promote that
public policy [of maintaining public health and morals],” then the flag
39
40
41
42
43
44

45
46
47

Robert B. Gosline, Power of Board of Education to Compel Salute to Flag – Invasion of
Religious Freedom, 2 OHIO STATE L.J. 151, 152-53 (1936).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
Marjorie Hanson, Constitutional Law—Religious Liberty—School Code—Right of School
Board to Compel Salute to the Flag, 2 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 206, 207-09 (1936). When the
article was written, the cases had not been reported. The author relied on summaries of
them provided by the attorney for the plaintiff. Two cases the author identifies are
Commonwealth v. Kurak and Commonwealth v. Wilkovich, both decided in December,
1935. Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id. at 207-08 (citing Hardwick v. Bd. of Sch. Tr., 205 P. 49 (Cal. App. Ct. 1921)).
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salute requirement would be legitimate.48 Hanson’s commentary is an
indication of the deference to the legislature that was widespread in the
1930s. In her article, one can see a liberal tendency to sympathize with
a religious minority juxtaposed against another characteristic of liberal
thinking in the 1930s, which was deference to state legislation. It should
also be noted that in the 1938 circuit court decision in Gobitis, which
held in favor of the Witnesses, the exact same point was made. The
circuit court stated that if there had been a state-wide law in
Pennsylvania, and not merely a local school board regulation, the
outcome would have been different. 49
B. The Origin of the Flag Salute in Schools
The second topic is the origin of the flag salute itself. On September
8, 1892, a popular children’s magazine, The Youth’s Companion,
published the first copy of the Pledge of Allegiance. It was written by
Francis Bellamy, a staff member of the magazine and a Christian
socialist minister. In 1888, the magazine had already begun a campaign
to sell U.S. flags inexpensively to public schools. Bellamy and the
magazine owner’s nephew, James B. Upham, used the 400th
anniversary of Columbus reaching the Americas to advance the
schoolhouse flag movement. The article of September 8 prescribed “[a]
uniform Programme for every school in America” which Bellamy had
already convinced numerous school superintendents to agree to at a
conference in February, 1892.50 On October 21, “the 400th Anniversary
of the Discovery of America,” students were to salute the flag and say,
“I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the Republic for which it stands:
one Nation, indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.” 51 “At the
words, ‘to my Flag,’ the right hand is extended gracefully, palm upward,
towards the Flag, and remains in this gesture till the end of the
affirmation.”52
The National Education Association (renamed in the 1930s as the
American Association of School Administrators) began to sponsor the

48
49

50
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52

Id. at 209.
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683, 693 (3d Cir. 1939) (providing background
on three cases where the Court had affirmed flag saluting regulations that had been
supported by both legislative and judicial means within the state).
Francis Bellamy et al., National School Celebration of Columbus Day. The Official
Programme., THE YOUTH’S COMPANION, Sept. 8, 1892, at 446 (Bellamy’s name appears at
the end of the article with his title as Chairman of the Executive Committee).
Id.
Id.

2022

Life's Complexities

155

flag salute in 1892.53 Kansas implemented a statute in 1907 requiring a
salute to the flag at the opening of each school day. 54 In the same year,
the Supreme Court held that a state could prohibit the representation of
the flag on a beer bottle.55
Therefore a State will be wanting in care for the well-being of its
people if it ignores the fact that they regard the flag as a symbol of
their country’s power and prestige, and will be impatient if any open
disrespect is shown towards it. It is not extravagant to say that to all
lovers of the country it signifies government resting on the consent
of the governed; liberty regulated by law; the protection of the weak
against the strong; security against the exercise of arbitrary power;
and absolute safety for free institutions against foreign aggression.56

In the mid-1920s, the American Legion distributed millions of
pamphlets promoting the flag salute and urged lawmakers to pass bills
to make the pledge mandatory in public schools. 57 By 1942, twenty
states had implemented such laws.58
C. Flag Salute Cases Prior to Gobitis
In 1943, Madaline Kinter Remmlein wrote59 that the
constitutionality of the flag salute requirement was first challenged in
New Jersey in the 1937 case of Hering v. State Board of Education.60
The flag salute statute was upheld, and an appeal to the Supreme Court
was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.61 She noted
that constitutional challenges were numerous after 1937 and occurred in
thirteen states.62 There were actually a few cases even before 1937, as
Hanson showed.63 However, the chronology is less important than the
consistency of the results until 1938. The early cases in which the
Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged the compulsory flag salute suggest that
the repeated rulings against the Witnesses were overdetermined by the
convergence of conservative (patriotic) and progressive (pro53
54
55
56
57
58
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60
61
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63

Madaline Kinter Remmlein, Editorial Note, Constitutional Implications of Compulsory
Flag Salute Statutes, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 70, 71 (1943).
Id.; see also E.T. FAIRCHILD, STATE OF KANSAS, LAWS RELATING TO THE COMMON SCHOOLS
OF KANSAS 120 (State Printing Office, Topeka 1909).
Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 42 (1907).
Id. at 43.
Jennifer Jacobs Henderson, Conditional Liberty: The Flag Salute Before Gobitis and
Barnette, 47 J. CHURCH & STATE 747, 748-49 (2005).
Id. at 749.
Remmlein, supra note 53, at 71-72.
See Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 194 A. 177, 177 (N.J. 1937).
Remmlein, supra note 53, at 72 n.7.
Id. at 72.
See generally Hanson, supra note 44.
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legislative) dispositions. Alternatively, one could say that dissents were
rare because there was not yet any coherent argument with which the
Witnesses could succeed–until they forged one themselves based on the
idea of “totalitarian” government.64
In Hering, a New Jersey court issued a brief opinion upholding a
state law requiring students to salute the flag and repeat the pledge every
day. Justice Bodine invoked two principles that reoccur concerning the
flag. “Those who resort to educational institutions maintained with the
state’s money are subject to the commands of the state.”65 And “[t]he
pledge of allegiance is, by no stretch of the imagination, a religious
rite.”66 The Court of Errors and Appeals upheld the decision in one
paragraph “for the reasons expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Bodine” merely adding that because, “[t]he wisdom of the statute under
review was for the legislature; we express no view thereon.” 67
In another 1937 case, the Georgia Supreme Court provided a fuller
rationale for the Atlanta Board of Education’s requirement to salute the
flag.68 In contrast to Hering, the reasons why the Jehovah’s Witnesses
refused to participate in the pledge are laid out. Dorothy Leoles, age
twelve, “refused to salute the flag for the sole reason that she believe[d]
that to do so [was] an act of worship of an image or emblem.”69 She was
expelled from school and barred from attending any public schools in
Atlanta. Although the flag regulation was local, the court noted, “it is
the policy of this State, through instruction in schools by patriotic
teachers, to instill the youth thereof with the principles of American
government and patriotic duty.”70 The court specified that the use of free
public schools is a “privilege” predicated on “compliance with the
reasonable regulations imposed by the proper school authorities.” 71
Concerning the alleged violation of religious freedom per the U.S. and
Georgia constitutions, the court stated that the flag is a symbol of the
United States as “a land of freedom” and “disrespect to the flag is
64
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67
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The term “totalitarian” occurs in the federal district court decision in Gobitis v. Minersville
Sch. Dist., 24 F.Supp. 271, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1938). “Our country’s safety surely does not
depend upon the totalitarian idea of forcing all citizens into one common mold of thinking
and acting or requiring them to render a lip service of loyalty in a manner which conflicts
with their sincere religious convictions.” Id. at 274. I show later in this article how the
Witnesses brought the term into legal debate.
Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 189 A. 629, 629 (N.J. 1937).
Id.
Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 194 A. 177, 178 (N.J 1937).
Leoles v. Landers, 192 S.E. 218, 221-23 (Ga. 1937).
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id. at 221.
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disrespect to the government.”72 “Each individual . . . has a right to
determine for himself all of those questions which relate to his relation
to the Creator of the Universe. No civil authority can coerce him to
accept any religious doctrine or teaching . . . .”73 But saluting the flag
“is by no stretch of reasonable imagination a ‘religious rite.’ It is only
an act showing one’s respect for the government . . . .” 74 The court
ended by observing that a child is not required to attend a public school
and may attend a private school.75
In Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, the Supreme Court of California
acknowledged the sincere objections to the flag salute professed by
Charlotte Gabrielli, age nine, and her father, as Jehovah’s Witnesses. 76
But the court, noting that the Supreme Court of the United States had
dismissed similar cases, concluded that the question of whether a
violation of religious freedom occurred “is no longer open.” 77 As for a
possible violation of the state constitution’s provision of religious
freedom, the Supreme Court of California simply asserted that all the
arguments against a federal constitutional violation applied to the
state.78 It would require “cogent reasons” before “a state court in
construing a provision of the state Constitution will depart from the
construction placed by the Supreme Court of the United States on a
similar provision in the federal Constitution.”79 The court thus did not
enter into extensive doctrinal discussion, but it did observe that religious
freedom in general means that the legislature, while it has no power to
regulate “mere opinion,” does have the authority to reach “actions.” 80
Similarly, in 1938, the Suffolk County Court in New York heard an
appeal from the father of Grace Sandstrom, a girl who had refused to
salute the flag in accordance with a statewide law. Judge Hill provided
a very extensive explanation of the theological beliefs of the child. He
included excerpts from a pamphlet called Loyalty, which was read over
72
73
74
75
76
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79
80

Id. at 222.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 222-23.
82 P.2d 391, 392 (Cal. 1938) (overturning Gabrielli v Knickerbocker, 74 P.2d 290 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1937)). A salient point is that the federal district court’s 1938 decision in Gobitis
was a momentous departure. When Frankfurter overruled it, as well as the circuit court
ruling, he was not only supporting state legislation and school board regulations; he was
also re-asserting the logic employed throughout the state court decisions, though he raised
the philosophical plane of discussion, as we will see.
Id.
Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 394 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding the banning of
polygamy)).
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the radio on October 6, 1935, by Joseph Franklin Rutherford, known as
Judge Rutherford, the President of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. This
broadcast helps to explain the outbreak of conflicts over the flag in 1935
and 1936. Among the excerpts: “The flag of the United States is not a
flag of Jehovah God and Christ Jesus. It is the emblem of power that
rules the nation; and no one can truthfully say that God and Christ Jesus
rule a government where crime is rampant.”81 But the court did not
consider such beliefs to be a sufficient basis for an exemption. Judge
Hill stated, “[i]t should be a function of government to inculcate
patriotism and to instill a recognition of the blessings conferred by
orderly government under the Constitution of the nation and State . . . .
The flag is the symbol of these aims and purposes.”82 Hill cautioned
against granting exemptions based on religion. “The religious zealot, if
his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes
in furtherance of a school system that compelled students to salute the
flag.”83 The opinion closes with a gesture to legislative jurisdiction. “It
is not for us to consider matters of policy. That is for the Legislature,
and that policy which decrees that pupils in the public schools of the
State shall salute the United States flag does not violate any rights
guaranteed by the United States and the State Constitutions.”84
When the Sandstrom case came to the New York Court of Appeals
in January 1939, Chief Judge Crane explored the theological context
before pronouncing on the Free Exercise Clauses under the federal and
state constitutions. Notably, he included a long extract from a dialogue
with young Grace Sandstrom. The thirteen-year-old student stated that
she would be “slain” if she saluted the flag. 85 Crane proceeded to state
that “the flag has nothing to do with religion, and in all the history of
this country it has stood for just the contrary, namely, the principle that
people may worship as they please or need not worship at all.”86 “The
States, like Congress, are free to reach actions which are in violation of
81
82
83
84
85

86

People ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 3 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1008 (N.Y. Cty. Ct., 1938).
Id.
Id. at 1009.
Id.
People ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 18 N.E.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1939) (“People who
write the pamphlets and papers for your religion, do you know if they ever said
anything [about] whether Jehovah’s Witnesses should salute the flag or not? A.
In the ‘Loyalty’ booklet it told about other school children who had refused and
that they were expelled. Q. What do you think would happen to you if you salute
the flag contrary to your conscience? A. When the battle of Armageddon comes,
I would be slain. Because the flag is an image and it says in the Bible not to bow
down to images.”).
Id.
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social duties or subversive of good order.” 87 While recognizing the
girl’s sincerity, Crane stated that she lacked the capacity to discern the
requisites of law and order. “These are ponderous truths to flash upon
this little girl who in all conscientiousness cannot, at her time of life,
grasp them.”88 However, he counseled the school districts to exercise
moderation. “May there not be, however, a better way for
accomplishing the purposes of this law than immediate resort to
disciplinary measures?”89
Judge Lehman’s concurring opinion is the closest thing to a
dissenting opinion that one finds in any of the state court cases on the
flag salute controversy. He agreed with Chief Judge Crane that the flag
“has nothing to do with religion”90 but questioned whether the
legislature intended that each child be “compelled to join in the
exercises.”91 Religious freedom “includes the right of the individual to
carry out every obligation which he believes has a divine sanction.”92
Lehman nevertheless concurred because he did not think that providing
an exemption to the Witnesses was tantamount to reversing the position
of the lower court or invalidating the statute. He suggested that the
statute could be interpreted as non-compulsory and that it was advisable
to exercise restraint to avoid “clashes” between government and the
dictates of conscience.93
Though the state court opinions were consistent in upholding the
compulsory flag salute, one senses that a consensus was breaking down
in Judge Lehman’s concluding comments.
She does not refuse to show love and respect for the flag. She refuses
only to show her love and respect in manner which she believes her
God has forbidden. She asks only that she be not compelled to incur
the wrath of her God by disobedience to His commands. The flag
salute would lose no dignity or worth if she were permitted to refrain
from joining in it.94

Through the language Lehman used, he appeared to sympathize with
the dilemma religious dissenters faced in following their religious
principles and refusing to salute the flag.

87
88
89
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91
92
93
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Id. at 843.
Id.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id. at 846 (citing United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931)).
Id. at 846-47.
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III. TOTALITARIANISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE
A central argument of this article is that legal attitudes toward the
compulsory flag salute shifted in the late 1930s when the term
“totalitarian” entered the debate. The term was put into wide circulation
by the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Historians of political thought have long
recognized the importance of the idea of totalitarianism, but the
important role of the Witnesses in inscribing this idea in appellate
litigation has not received much attention.95
A. Totalitarianism as a Political Construct
Totalitarianism, as a word and concept, has been a crucial
component of political theory since the Cold War. The most influential
text is Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, first published
in 1951. Arendt used the term to capture the common features of Nazi
Germany and Soviet Communism, particularly the belief that “anything
is possible,” that is, that every facet of life, including human nature, can
be molded by the state into a unified whole.96 For Arendt, the
quintessential institution of totalitarian regimes is the extermination
camp, which she described as “the testing ground” for the achievement
of “total domination.”97 However, the word “totalitarian” took on a
different meaning in the course of litigation about the flag salute. First,
attorneys for the Witnesses applied the term not only to Nazi Germany
and Soviet Communism but to Italy and other regimes, including the
U.S. Secondly, while Arendt regarded totalitarianism as an
“unprecedented”98 feature of the twentieth century, the Witnesses
regarded it as a recurrent phenomenon, dating to ancient times. Thirdly,
since the extermination camps originated in 1941,99 they could not
function as a symbol of “totalitarian” government before then. The
following discussion will show that the Witnesses construed not
concentration camps, but the saluting of flags and of political leaders as
the quintessentially totalitarian act.
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But see Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in Presidential Leadership, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 363 (2008) (offering insights into the place of “totalitarianism” in public
discussion of the flag controversy).
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM, 565, 568-69, 591 (Schocken Books,
2004) (on “everything is possible”).
Id. at 565.
Id. at 576; see also Peter Baehr, Identifying the Unprecedented: Hannah Arendt,
Totalitarianism, and the Critique of Sociology, 67 AM. SOCIO. REV. 804, 811 (2002).
The Death Camps, YAD VASHEM, https://www.yadvashem.org/holocaust/about/finalsolution/death-camps.html [https://perma.cc/EN2Y-Z6YX].
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The word “totalitarian” is not in the Constitution; hence, one could
argue that is has no legal, only rhetorical, significance. Putting aside the
fact that effective rhetoric is precisely what makes Barnette a canonical
case, there is a purely legal response. The word “democracy” is not in
the Constitution either, but the term figures centrally in constitutional
doctrines, especially in the realm of the First Amendment. This is
because “structural” arguments play a vital role in interpreting the Bill
of Rights. Structural arguments arise from generalizations about the
mode of government that the Constitution, as a whole, is allegedly
designed to support.100
Some of the most influential interpretations of the First Amendment
are based on structural arguments; notably, the claim that the
Constitution establishes popular sovereignty and democratic selfgovernment. In Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government, a
work that had a major impact on Justice Brennan 101 when he composed
the Court’s opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan, Alexander
Meiklejohn argued that the Constitution was set up principally to enable
citizens to govern themselves. Meiklejohn argued that self-government
entails the “absolute”102 protection by the First Amendment of all
political ideas, including even anti-democratic ideas.
It makes no difference whether a man is advocating conscription or
opposing it, speaking in favor of a war or against it, defending
democracy or attacking it, planning a communist reconstruction of
our economy or criticising it. So long as his active words are those
of participation in public discussion and public decision of matters
of public policy, the freedom of those words may not be abridged.
That freedom is the basic postulate of a society which is governed
by the votes of its citizens.103

In New York Times, Brennan, too, interpreted the First Amendment
in the context of an open democratic public sphere of debate.
The theory of our Constitution is that every citizen may speak his
mind and every newspaper express its view on matters of public
concern and may not be barred from speaking or publishing because
those in control of government think that what is said or written is
unwise, unfair, false, or malicious.104

100
101
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104

PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 74 (1982).
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1965).
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 17 (1st
ed. 1948) (arguing that the freedom of speech is absolute).
Id. at 46.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 298-99 (1964).
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For Jackson, too, the idea of democracy was vital in his conception
of free speech; but his vision of democracy was entirely different.
Meiklejohn did not write about freedom of speech until the late 1940s,
and his ideas were explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court 105 before
New York Times consecrated them. Prior to New York Times, the “clear
and present danger” doctrine precluded the ultra-high level of protection
for political speech that Meiklejohn supported.106 Jackson subscribed to
a version of democratic theory structured by concern about the potential
of democracy to morph into dictatorship–with freedom of speech as a
contributing factor. This version of democratic theory presupposed that
the tendency of any free market of ideas is to be manipulated by antidemocratic extremists. Jackson believed that the government must stifle
communist and fascist ideas and of course must not promote such ideas
either. When the Witnesses began to portray the flag salute as
“totalitarian,” Jackson took them seriously. In fact, the term
“totalitarian” as used by the Witnesses confirmed and deepened
Jackson’s anxiety about the potential of democracy to morph into
dictatorship.
B. The Legal Significance of Totalitarianism
Since “democracy” is ingrained in First Amendment jurisprudence,
it follows that the term “totalitarian” has legal significance to the degree
that it constitutes one’s particular vision of democracy. It is, then, very
important to track the emergence and influence of this term in legal
argument. The upshot is that the word “totalitarian” became inscribed
in the compulsory flag salute controversy, starting in 1938, and Jackson
solidified it in his famous Barnette opinion.
Writing about the history of the word “totalitarian”, Bruno
Bongiovanni discussed its origin in an Italian article written in 1923. 107
The word was originally used to criticize the government, but in 1925,
Mussolini appropriated it as a positive description for his political
program.108 Bongiovanni is less clear when it comes to the origins of
the word in English. He suggests that the term entered the domain of
political theory in 1934 through George Sabine’s entry, entitled State,
in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.109 Bongiovanni provides
105
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Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 n.5 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Harry Kalven Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the “Central Meaning of the First
Amendment”, SUP. CT. REV. 191, 204-05 (1964).
Bruno Bongiovanni, Totalitarianism: The Word and the Thing, 3 J. MOD. EUROPEAN HIST.
5, 5 (2005).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
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no earlier English examples. Although he mentions in passing Giovanni
Gentile’s article, The Philosophic Basis of Fascism, published in
Foreign Affairs, he does not observe that the term appears prominently
there.110 “In the definition of Fascism, the first point to grasp is the
comprehensive, or as Fascists say, the ‘totalitarian’ scope of its doctrine,
which concerns itself not only with political organization and political
tendency, but with the whole will and thought and feeling of the
nation.”111
The second alternative, given effect in the fascist governments of
Italy and Germany, has produced what is called the totalitarian
conception of the state, the doctrine that the state is not only
sovereign in a legal sense but has also the function of regulating
every department of social life—education, religion and art as well
as capital and labor and the whole national economy.112

Clearly, the Jehovah’s Witnesses were not the first to use
“totalitarian” in English, but their adoption of this neologism began
quite early,113 and they spread the term with an inflection that the above
usages do not contain: they insisted upon the existence of strong
totalitarian tendencies in the U.S.114
In Warning, Rutherford portrayed an eternal battle between the God
Jehovah and the devil. The devil wagered that he could induce humans
to blaspheme God; thus, every person is under a test to remain true to
God and not serve the devil. Satan uses the tools of “politics”115 and
110
111
112
113
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115

Id. at 7-8.
Giovanni Gentile, The Philosophic Basis of Fascism, 6 FOREIGN AFFS. 290, 299 (1928).
George Sabine, State, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 328, 330 (Edwin R.A.
Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 14th ed. 1934).
See generally William Jones, The Path from Weimar Communism to the Cold War. Franz
Borkenau and “The Totalitarian Enemy”, in TOTALITARISMUS 35 (Alfred Soellner et al.
eds., 1997). Franz Borkenau, generally considered to be one of the first political theorists
to use the term repeatedly in English, deployed it in 1938 and 1939. Judge Rutherford, who
also began wielding the term in 1938, must also be counted as an early user of the term.
The turning point came in 1938; it was then that the Witnesses embarked on a campaign to
denounce their adversaries as “totalitarian.” Among the occurrences of “totalitarian” in
1938 was an advertisement in the Witnesses’ magazine, Consolation, for a pamphlet
entitled Warning by Rutherford. The ad states that Rutherford discusses the “totalitarian
rule which is now sweeping the earth.” Warning, CONSOLATION, Oct. 19, 1938, at 32. Lest
one think that I am embarking on a historical digression by focusing on Rutherford, one
should bear in mind that the “Judge,” in addition to being the leader of the Witnesses, really
was an attorney and judge, and that he served as counsel to the Witnesses in several
Supreme Court cases prior to Barnette (but not Barnette; he died in 1942). He co-authored
several briefs which integrated “totalitarian” into the analysis of the flag salute issue.
Audio file: Warning by Judge Rutherford (1938) (accessed at https://archive.org
/details/WarningByJudgeRutherford [https://perma.cc/86CJ-ZHDT]). I was not able to
obtain a hard copy of the pamphlet, but this is a recording that Rutherford made of it.
Although the record may not be an exact replica of the pamphlet, both were issued in 1938.
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“organized religion”116 to corrupt human beings. The Catholic Church,
according to Rutherford, is the primary religious tool of the devil.117
Governmental organizations are also agencies which the devil uses to
substitute idolatry for God’s kingdom. While “totalitarian” government,
according to Rutherford, goes back to ancient times, it is particularly
acute in the present, for a “great battle”118 is now taking place between
Jehovah and the devil. Thus, a “great monstrosity” is growing.
That monstrosity is the government of the various nations under the
arbitrary dictator, that is to say, a dictatorial government otherwise
called a totalitarian rule. It arose first in Russia under the guise of
Bolshevism or communism. Then it came forth in Italy under the
name of fascism and then in Germany labelled as Nazism.119
Such monstrous dictatorial governments attempt to enforce rules or
laws such as the heiling of men, compulsory saluting of flags, and
other things, thus causing or attempting to cause the people to
acknowledge that their protection and salvation comes from man
and the power of men represented by some emblem or flag.120

For Rutherford, to salute a political leader or the flag is to succumb
to the devil or totalitarianism, which is the same thing. It makes no
difference that the flag represents a democratic country.
Turning to some of the many briefs that Rutherford co-authored, we
can observe a mixture of theology and law. Cantwell v. Connecticut was
the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down a state law by
incorporating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment against
the states.121 The case concerned a Connecticut statute requiring persons
soliciting funds to obtain a certificate from the Secretary of the Public
Welfare Council.122 The Secretary was also to determine if the
fundraising party was “a bona fide object of charity.”123 In their brief
for the Witnesses, Rutherford and Hayden C. Covington, who
represented the Witnesses in many cases, wrote:
Until recently a law such as this, as applied to sincere followers of
Jesus Christ, was not dreamed of in America. But since the advance
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Therefore, the recording, even if different, serves as evidence for his discourse at that time.
The discussion of “politics” as a tool of the devil is at 10:35.
Id. at 11:14.
Id. at 18:12.
Id. at 2:40, 3:08, 8:42, 24:16 (explaining that the Day of Judgment is at hand and the
choices that people must make to escape judgment).
Id. at 30:38.
Id. at 31:14.
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
Id. at 300.
Id. at 302.
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of the totalitarian spirit and of the conspiracy to rule America by
dictators many strange and unusual things have come to pass. The
dictatorial and totalitarian spirit has struck down the institutions of
life and liberty in all the countries of Europe, and is rapidly moving
forward in this country.124

They also stated, “this nation within a short time will be in a
condition like that which now prevails in totalitarian states of
Europe.”125
In Schneider v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court struck down, again
on First Amendment grounds, multiple city ordinances which required
a permit for the distribution of handbills.126 The ordinances sought to
prevent littering on the streets. Irvington, New Jersey went a step further
and limited house-to-house distribution.127 In a petitioner’s brief on
behalf of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Irvington, Rutherford cited only one
source other than biblical ones. 128
If the Lord Jesus Christ, acting exactly as He did when He was on
earth in the flesh, were here again and went from house to house in
the Town of Irvington doing good and preaching the gospel (Luke
13:22), He would be liable to be incarcerated in the town calaboose
for not having first applied to the police to grant Him permission to
do what His heavenly Father commanded Him to do.129

“Only the corporate or totalitarian states attempt to regulate the
conscience of men or attempt to compel them to obey man’s law which
is in derogation of the law of Almighty God.”130 There are several other
briefs filed by Rutherford and Covington which analogized the U.S. to
Nazi Germany and warned of “totalitarian” domination. 131
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Appellants’ and Petitioner’s Brief at 22, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (No.
632), 1940 WL 46871.
Id. at 32.
308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
Id. at 157.
See generally Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (No.
11), 1939 WL 48520 (citing eight Biblical references and one Supreme Court case).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
See e.g., Petitioner’s Brief at 41, Bowden v. City of Fort Smith, 315 U.S. 793 (1942)
(Mem.) (No. 314), WL 52779 (“The only factor which distinguishes this country as a
republic with a democratic form of government, and therefore the only thing worthy of
preservation from totalitarian aggression, is that American heritage epitomized as the ‘Bill
of Rights.’”); Respondents’ Brief at 21, Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940) (No. 690), WL 46893 [hereinafter Gobitis Respondents’ Brief] (“Why this modern
burning zeal compelling the saluting of flags and ‘heiling’ of men? It is a movement in
support of Satan’s original challenge to Jehovah God that he, Satan, could turn all men
against God. (Job 2:5) The Hitler totalitarian régime denounces Jehovah God, snatches
children from their parents who worship Jehovah God; imprisons or kills the parents who
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C. Totalitarianism in Barnette
In the Appellee’s Brief in Barnette, Covington (no longer partnering
with Rutherford, who was deceased) deployed the “totalitarian” theme
with subtlety. There is considerably more secular legal argument in this
brief than the others. And while many biblical references are still used,
the word “totalitarian” is at times deployed in a secular manner. Here,
for example, it is inscribed in a historical narrative:
In 1907 the first compulsory flag-salute regulation appeared in
Kansas. Thereafter, until more recent years, compulsory
participation in the ceremony did not increase or prosper; on the
contrary, it disappeared until the rise of “fascism” and “nazism” in
continental Europe. Concurrently with the spread of totalitarianism
various states of the Union passed laws requiring the compulsory
flag salute in schools. Between 1935 and 1939 eighteen states saw
fit to expel children who refused to salute the national flag because
of conscientious objection. Since the Gobitis decision in June 1940
and the present national emergency, children who refuse to salute
the flag have been expelled in every state of the Union.132

Here, Covington advocates a principle of strict scrutiny:
The present dominance of totalitarian ideas in other parts of the
world suggests that an extension of legislative power in this
direction should be viewed with suspicion and, in the absence of a
showing of clear necessity, should be condemned as a deprivation
of individual liberty without due process of law.133

In the conclusion, Covington does inject a strong theological tone:
The compulsory flag-salute regulation is being used as a part of the
totalitarian conspiracy for world domination to “get” Jehovah’s
witnesses in the same manner as Daniel was framed, while the great
mass of the people are otherwise being regimented. It is manifestly
foolish and silly legislation. The approximately seven years of
endurance of persecution in the United States because of the
regulation, and more than ten years’ endurance of suffering for
refusal to heil Hitler and his satellites and their respective “flags” in
the axis dominated countries, should prove to all reasonable persons
that the Law of Almighty God does not change . . . .134

132
133
134

persist in obeying Almighty God. The flag saluting rule by school children, adopted and
enforced in the States of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Massachusetts, are leading in that
same direction. Children have been expelled from schools, taken away from their parents,
and committed to reform schools, and thus the sanctity of the home broken up. Such is
cruelty heaped upon citizens without any just cause or excuse.”).
Barnette Appellees’ Brief, supra note 10, at 22 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 89.
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In sum, in the Appellee’s Brief in Barnette, the word “totalitarian”
glues together some sensible legal arguments and the Witnesses’
Manichean, or theologically polarized, view of the world.
If one reads the brief with Jackson’s opinion in mind, then a key
point in Covington’s discussion of freedom of speech is the right not to
be compelled to speak. Jackson is famous for turning this idea of “no
compelled speech” into an enduring First Amendment doctrine.
Covington wrote:
When the right of free speech is exercised the person says
something, or performs an act, a gesture symbolic of speech, to
communicate to others an idea . . . . Or, as in the case at bar, the
person’s electing to withhold a gesture (or oral utterance) by means
of which a certain state of mind is openly manifested or declared to
others, may be clamed [sic] to be violative of a statute or schoolboard regulation. In the case here, appellees are compelled, under
threat of severe penalty, to cause their children to communicate or
“say” something which the children’s and the parents’ sincere and
conscientious understanding of the CREATOR’S written Law
convinces them to be morally wrong for them to “say” . . . .135

To strengthen the point, Covington references Stromberg v.
California, in which the Court upheld the right of nineteen-year-old
Yetta Stromberg to lead a group of younger children in a salute to a
reproduction of the flag of the Soviet Union.136 Stromberg was an
American-born girl of Russian parentage who owned books and
pamphlets which contained “incitements to violence,” and was a
“member of the Young Communist League,” which was “affiliated with
the Communist Party.”137 As Stromberg led the pledge, the children
recited, “I pledge allegiance to the workers’ red flag and to the cause for
which it stands, one aim throughout our lives, freedom for the working
class.”138 Covington capitalized on the irony.
Compelling one to communicate by means of oral utterance or by
gesture, under penalty, is quite as clear an invasion of the right of
free speech as the attempt by law to prevent expression or
communication by word or sign, such as use of the “red flag” in the
Stromberg case, supra . . . . If the right is given or safeguarded by
the Constitution to salute the flag of a foreign power whose
principles are at enmity to the principles of the United States
Constitution, then with greater force of reason the Constitution of
135
136
137
138

Id. at 66.
See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 362 (1931).
Id.
Id.; Barnette Appellees’ Brief, supra note 10, at 65 (referencing Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 362 (1931)).
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the United States shields the poor and helpless child who, bearing
no allegiance to a foreign power, refuses for conscience’[s] sake to
salute the national flag.139

The word “totalitarian” is not used in this context, but the message
is clear. A real concern to avert totalitarianism would allow a young
person to refrain from saluting the American flag and might not allow a
person to salute the Soviet flag: American law has it backwards.
Admittedly, Barnette and Stromberg are distinguishable. Most
notably, Stromberg does not concern public schools. However, when
powerfully evocative terms like “totalitarian” are brought into
discussion, they tend to blur distinctions. One of the things that makes
Jackson’s opinion in Barnette so hypnotic is that he saturated it with the
language of force. The word “totalitarian”, which he uses once, is the
hub from which emanate the spokes of “coerce” (used four other
times)140 as in “to coerce uniformity of sentiment,”141 “force,”142
“graveyard,”143 “exterminating,”144 and other gratuitously violent terms.
Put differently, his hyperbolic language would have been nonsensical to
the judicial community if the specter of “totalitarian” government did
not serve to make a slippery slope leading from the flag salute to
dictatorship and genocide comprehensible.
Rutherford and Covington must be credited with getting Jackson
and others to regard the U.S. as a locus of “totalitarian” tendencies
which the judiciary must try to contain. In this context, Jackson
famously declared:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life,
liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.145

Although the passage articulates the concept of strict scrutiny which
is now a settled doctrine, for Jackson in 1943 it was a dictum, an
effusion of the moment; it was not intended to have a legally binding

139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Barnette Appellees’ Brief, supra note 10 at 66-67.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630, 633, 634, 640 (1943).
Id. at 640.
Id. 634.
Id. at 641.
Id.
Id. at 638.
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effect on Jackson himself, let alone the Court. This is evident from
Jackson’s own opinions.
D. Totalitarianism in Terminiello
In Terminiello v. Chicago, a suspended Catholic priest who
delivered an anti-Black and anti-Jewish oration to the Christian
Veterans of America was charged with breaching the peace and
convicted of violating a Chicago city ordinance. 146 The priest argued
that the ordinance violated his right to free speech, and the United States
Supreme Court agreed. The majority declared:
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends
on free discussion. . . . it is only through free debate and free
exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of
the people . . . . The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of
ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets
us apart from totalitarian regimes.147

This is a Cold War version of “totalitarian” theory: America has a
libertarian tradition that distinguishes it from fascist and communist
regimes. But Jackson believed that freedom of speech in a democracy
facilitates the welling up of political extremism. He saw Terminiello as
a kind of Hitler. “His speech . . . followed, with fidelity that is more than
coincidental, the pattern of European fascist leaders.” 148 Jackson plainly
contradicted his paean to the Bill of Rights in Barnette:
The present obstacle to mastery of the streets by either radical or
reactionary mob movements is not the opposing minority. It is the
authority of local governments which represent the free choice of
democratic and law-abiding elements, of all shades of opinion, but
who, whatever their differences, submit them to free elections which
register the results of their free discussion.149

Here, Jackson reveals a vision of the “totalitarian” threat very
different from the Court’s majority when he adds, “This drive by
totalitarian groups to undermine the prestige and effectiveness of local
democratic governments is advanced whenever either of them can win
from this Court a ruling which paralyzes the power of these officials.” 150
In other words, not only can government be a source of totalitarian
culture as Jackson argued in Barnette; there is also the danger of
unfettered civil society becoming totalitarian. The judiciary should not
146
147
148
149
150

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949).
Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
Id. at 22 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id.
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restrict the action of states seeking to contain political extremism. With
words no less eloquent than the “fixed star” but much less quoted
thereafter, Jackson concluded, “The choice is not between order and
liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either.
There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic
with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of
Rights into a suicide pact.”151
The idea of constitutional “suicide” was not unique to Jackson. Karl
Loewenstein, in his theory of “militant democracy,” argued that fascist
parties in Europe took advantage of democratic liberties to subvert
democracy from within the system.152 Militant democracy meant that
free societies must protect themselves against the abuse of freedom.
Loewenstein faulted the European democracies for their “legalistic selfcomplacency and suicidal lethargy.”153 He was explicit that limiting
freedom of speech and association is essential for the self-maintenance
of democracies.154 Loewenstein’s ideas were influential in the making
of West Germany’s post-war constitution, the “Basic Law”, which was
ratified in 1949, the year Terminiello was decided.155 The Basic Law,
which is now the Constitution of a united Germany, does not afford
freedom of speech to those who oppose the democratic order. 156 The
Basic Law also permits the Constitutional Court to ban extremist
political parties. The Communist Party of Germany has been banned in
Germany since 1956.157
It seems likely that Jackson, who was the Chief Prosecutor in the
Nuremberg Trials, would have been familiar with the Basic Law and its
underlying philosophy. But that is not the only reason to presume that
151
152

153
154
155

156

157

Id. at 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV.,
417, 423 (1937) (“The fact that fascism is not an ideology, but only a political technique,
is . . . victorious only under the extraordinary conditions offered by democratic institutions.
Its success is based on its perfect adjustment to democracy. Democracy and democratic
tolerance have been used for their own destruction.”).
Id. at 431.
Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV.,
638, 653 (1937).
Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 18 (Ger.), translation at https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0103 [https://perma.cc/YR3D-BCER]. See
generally R. W. Kostal, The Alchemy of Occupation: Karl Loewenstein and the Legal
Reconstruction of Nazi Germany, 1945-1946, 29 L. HIST. REV. 1, 1 (2011).
Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 18 (Ger.) (“Whoever abuses the freedom of
expression . . . in order to combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these basic
rights.”).
Id. at art. 21; see also Paul Franz, Unconstitutional and Outlawed Political Parties: A
German-American Comparison, 5 B.C. INT’L COMPAR. L. REV., 51, 59 (1982) (discussing
the banning of the German Communist Party).

2022

Life's Complexities

171

he knew Loewenstein’s work. The Court cited it in Beauharnais v.
Illinois,158 which concerned a hate speech law; that is, a statute
forbidding the portrayal of a class of citizens of any race or religion as
depraved, criminal, unchaste, or lacking virtue. 159 Frankfurter, writing
for the majority, upheld the statute. His opinion cited Loewenstein. 160
Jackson dissented on technical grounds, but he devoted a substantial
portion of his dissent to defending the value of what were then called
“group libel” statutes. Jackson did not cite Loewenstein, but he cited
another source which relied upon and developed Loewenstein’s ideas.
This was Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, David
Riesman’s pioneering article on hate speech. 161 Generally remembered
today as a sociologist and author of The Lonely Crowd (1950), Reisman
was trained in law. His Democracy and Defamation article argued that
the law regarding the libeling of individuals could also be applied to
find that an entire group of people were victims of defamation. The
article was briefly in vogue; not only Jackson but the majority in
Beauharnais cited it.162
There is even more in Beauharnais that undercuts Jackson’s
affirmation in Barnette that the Bill of Rights trumps democratically
enacted state legislation. In fact, Jackson admits that he has changed his
mind.
The spectrum of views expressed by my seniors shows that
disagreement as to the scope and effect of this Amendment underlies
this, as it has many another, division of the Court. All agree that the
Fourteenth Amendment does confine the power of the State to make
printed words criminal. Whence we are to derive metes and bounds
of the state power is a subject to the confusion of which, I regret to
say, I have contributed—comforted in the acknowledgment,
however, by recalling that this Amendment is so enigmatic and
abstruse that judges more experienced than I have had to reverse
themselves as to its effect on state power.163

He goes on to write,
The assumption of other dissents is that the “liberty” which the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against
158

159
160
161
162
163

See generally Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). See also HARRY KALVEN, JR.,
THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21-22 (1965) (discussing Beauharnais, which has
settled into oblivion, and the short life of the idea of group libel).
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251.
Id. at 259 n.9.
David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV.,
727, 732 (1942) (discussing Loewenstein’s idea of militant democracy).
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 261 n.16.
Id. at 287-88 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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denial by the States is the literal and identical “freedom of speech or
of the press” which the First Amendment forbids only Congress to
abridge. The history of criminal libel in America convinces me that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not “incorporate” the First, that the
powers of Congress and of the States over this subject are not of the
same dimensions, and that because Congress probably could not
enact this law it does not follow that the States may not.164

In sum, Jackson no longer believed that the First Amendment
applied to the states in full force.
E. Some Inconsistencies in Jackson’s Decisions
As described by Harry Kalven, Jr., Jackson, in Beauharnais, upheld
a “two-tier view of free speech.”165 Federal law is to be scrutinized more
closely than state law. There is, however, no hint of a two-tier view in
Barnette, in which Jackson wrote,
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures–Boards of
Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate,
and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not
perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.166

Barnette, in fact, represents an anomaly in Jackson’s legal career.
Before joining the Court, Jackson served as Solicitor General and
Attorney General under Franklin D. Roosevelt, advocating that
legislation limiting the free market should be immune from judicial
review. In 1941, he published The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy,167
in which he criticized the Court during the Lochner era for expanding
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down socially progressive
legislation. In 1955, he published The Supreme Court in the American
System of Government, in which he wrote,
I know of no modern instance in which any judiciary has saved a
whole people from the great currents of intolerance, passion,
usurpation, and tyranny which have threatened liberty and free
institutions . . . . it is my belief that the attitude of a society and of
its organized political forces, rather than its legal machinery, is the
controlling force in the character of free institutions.168

164
165
166
167
168

Id. at 288.
KALVEN, supra note 158, at 34.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941).
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 8081 (1955). Compare Jackson’s logic with Frankfurter’s:
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Let us now return, with a fresh perspective, to the “fixed star.” For
the sake of close analysis, it is worth quoting again:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.169

Steven Smith has observed that Jackson affirms two separate
propositions. The first is that governmental officials must always refrain
from prescribing political and other values. The second is that officials
cannot compel citizens to assent to the values they prescribe. Smith
acutely notes that the conjunction “or” separating the two principles
means that the propositions are distinct, and both are binding. He
suggests that Jackson would have done better to say “and,” resulting in
a single prohibition: when the government prescribes orthodoxies, it
cannot also compel every person to assent. Smith’s argument is sound
for two reasons. First, it defies common sense to say that government
cannot prescribe political values, because it does so all the time.
The bottom line is that governments, under our Constitution or
otherwise, are constantly and necessarily in the business of declaring
some things to be true and others to be false–of “prescribing what
shall be orthodox” in the diverse and sundry matters that
government deals with. And indeed, American governments have
from the beginning emphatically and sometimes eloquently enlisted
support on the basis of declarations of what were held out as
pertinent or important or even noble truths. Liberty. Equality.
Opportunity. “We hold these truths . . . .” This is a nation “dedicated
to the proposition that . . . .”170

According to Smith, the real problem Jackson meant to address was
not governments making ideological affirmations but governments
requiring subjects to replicate them.171 As Smith says, the first part of

169
170
171

[T]he real battles of liberalism are not won in the Supreme Court. To a large
extent the Supreme Court, under the guise of constitutional interpretation of
words whose contents are derived from the disposition of the Justices, is the
reflector of that impalpable but controlling thing, the general drift of public
opinion. Only a persistent, positive translation of the liberal faith into the
thoughts and acts of the community is the real reliance against the unabated
temptation to straitjacket the human mind.
FELIX FRANKFURTER, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, in LAW AND
POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913-1938, 195, 197 (Archibald
MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1962).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
Steven D. Smith, “Fixed Star” or Twin Star?: The Ambiguity of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV.
801, 811 (2019).
Id. at 806-07.
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the fixed star “is not a plausible account of what American governments
have ever done or ever could do.”172
I would go further. The second proposition, against compelled
speech, is indeed plausible, but Jackson himself did not adhere to it. This
is evident in Adler173 and Douds,174 where he sided with the majority
upholding oaths requiring the disavowal of communism and violent
revolution. The flag salute was unacceptable for Jackson, not because it
was compelled speech per se, but because he perceived it as a ceremony
resembling the rites of “totalitarian” governments.
For Jackson, the Bill of Rights was not a fixed star. His rhetoric
sounds profoundly censorious of all state laws that infringe upon free
speech, but the remedy he suggests has limited legal impact. The
Witnesses received an exemption; the flag salute law was not struck
down. If it is heinous for government to prescribe orthodox ideas, what
gives it the power to require the flag salute in the first place? Jackson
addresses the issue in a manner which, at first, suggests that the law
should be struck down.
The Gobitis decision, however, assumed, as did the argument in that
case and in this, that power exists in the State to impose the flag
salute discipline upon school children in general. The Court only
examined and rejected a claim based on religious beliefs of
immunity from an unquestioned general rule. The question which
underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony so
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed
upon the individual by official authority under powers committed to
any political organization under our Constitution. We examine
rather than assume existence of this power and, against this broader
definition of issues in this case, re-examine specific grounds
assigned for the Gobitis decision.175

According to Jay S. Bybee, Jackson did not in fact recognize the
power of West Virginia to prescribe the flag salute: “his approach called
for striking the law in its entirety.”176 An argument pulling in favor of
this view is that Jackson portrayed the compulsory flag salute as broad
in its impact: a violation of the free speech of both religious and secular
persons, and not merely an infringement of the free exercise of religion.
This was a novel move, presaged in Covington’s brief. 177 The circuit
172
173
174
175
176
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Id. at 813.
See generally Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
See generally Am. Commc’ns Ass’n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 422 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1943).
Bybee supra note 12, at 284.
See generally Barnette Appellees’ Brief, supra note 10.
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which held in favor of the Witnesses and overruled Gobitis had treated
the salute only as a religious freedom issue. 178 The amicus briefs from
the American Bar Association179 and the American Civil Liberties
Union180 contained no free speech arguments. The concurring opinion
of Justices Black and Douglas focused on religion.181 But Jackson
wrote,
While religion supplies appellees’ motive for enduring the
discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do
not share these religious views hold such a compulsory rite to
infringe constitutional liberty of the individual. It is not necessary to
inquire whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to
salute unless we first find power to make the salute a legal duty.182

This does sound as if Jackson was preparing to nullify the law in its
entirety. If it is inconsistent with freedom of speech and offends “many
citizens,” why should there be a flag salute requirement at all? However,
Bybee does not adduce any specific passage to prove that the decision
was so far reaching. There are, however, two passages which clearly
speak of granting an accommodation to those opposed to the salute.183
Even more conclusive is the simple fact that the decision affirms the
circuit court’s injunction to restrain enforcement against Jehovah’s
Witnesses.184 While Jackson’s rhetoric equating compelled speech with
totalitarianism is intense, the holding reverts to the piecemeal spirit of
religious accommodationism. So riveted have readers of the case been
by its dicta that they have overlooked its narrow holding.

178
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180
181
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183
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Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 252 (S.D. W. Va. 1942) (“the
regulation amounts to a denial of religious liberty . . . .”).
See generally Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar
Association, as Friends of the Court, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (No. 591), 1942 WL 75727.
Brief for Am. Civ. Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 591), 1943 WL 71854.
W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943) (“We believe that the
statute before us fails to accord full scope to the freedom of religion secured to the appellees
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
Id. at 634-35.
“But here the power of compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining
passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify an
effort even to muffle expression.” Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-34.
Id. at 642.
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IV. FRANKFURTER’S VOICE IN THE GREAT CONVERSATION
A. From Particularism to Pluralism
Given the inconsistency in Jackson’s opinion in Barnette, and the
inconsistency in his position on the Fourteenth Amendment over time,
Frankfurter’s mammoth dissent (it is 10,000 words long, almost four
times longer than his majority opinion in Gobitis) acquires a
correspondingly large significance. When one no longer adulates
Jackson’s opinion, then one ought not denigrate Frankfurter’s. A
respectful re-reading of his opinions in both cases becomes potentially
exciting in the interstice of Jackson’s contradictions. 185
The attitude I recommend is to regard oneself as a witness, not to a
truth incarnated by Jackson but to a serious debate over enduring
questions between Jackson and Frankfurter. Their debate over the flag
was part of a larger conversation about the meaning of the Constitution.
Writing about the educational ideal of “The Great Conversation,”
Robert M. Hutchins observed that “To put an end to the spirit of
inquiry . . . it is not necessary to burn the books. All we have to do is to
leave them unread for a few generations.” 186 Leaving Frankfurter unread
tends to close down inquiry.
Similar to the idea of the Great Conversation is Elie Wiesel’s
discussion of the Talmud. He describes the contention between the
School of Hillel and the School of Shammai in the first century B.C.E:
Rabbi Hillel was patient and tolerant with new students while Rabbi
Shammai was strict and unforgiving.187 A stranger came to Shammai
and asked to be taught the entire Torah quickly, while he stood on one
foot.188 Shammai cast him out, but Hillel received him politely. “If that
is what you wish, so be it. This is the substance of the law: ‘Do not do
unto others what you do not want them to do unto you.’ All the rest is
commentary–now go and study.”189 After discussing how in his youth
he preferred Hillel, Wiesel states, “Both may be right, provided the two
options remain open; even though Hillel’s decision prevails, both
opinions must be transmitted.”190 Wiesel goes on to say that in Jewish
theology, two opposing attitudes can be right at different times. “God
185
186
187
188
189
190

Such a reading deserves a separate article. Here, I will only counsel an attitude of mind to
bring to the reading, and I will suggest why Frankfurter’s opinions are not outdated.
ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, THE GREAT CONVERSATION: THE SUBSTANCE OF A LIBERAL
EDUCATION 2 (1952).
ELIE WIESEL, SAGES AND DREAMERS 169 (1991).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
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alone is always right. God alone knows history in its totality; only
fragments are shown to man.”191
This attitude is all the more proper because it was Frankfurter’s own
attitude toward life and the law. He was impervious to the all-knowing
rhetoric of the Witnesses, including the grandiloquent rhetoric of
totalitarianism. In the first words in his Barnette dissent, he identifies
himself as a Jew, “[o]ne who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted
minority in history . . . .”192 It is a brilliant identity-based opening
because it allows him to make several points at once. First, being in a
minority group himself, he is not “insensible”193 to the condition of the
Witnesses as a minority. Second, his Judaism gives him a personal
reason to readily accept “the general libertarian views in the Court’s
opinion . . . .”194 Last, of course he makes the case for “judicial selfrestraint,” a term he will repeat four times in the opinion.195 To
dramatize to the reader that he has turned a corner from the particularism
of his Jewish identity to the non-denominational view of a judge,
Frankfurter refers to a sacred text that is not his own, “[b]ut as judges
we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic.” 196 The
allusion is to a letter written by Saint Paul to the Galatians, 3:28. 197 It is
striking to note that his only usage of the word “Jew” comes from a
Christian passage which he deploys to suggest that one should surmount
one’s given identity.
One can only imagine what Frankfurter must have thought of the
briefs submitted by the Witnesses in Gobitis and Barnette. In the Gobitis
brief, the Jews are portrayed as a people who forsook their covenant
with God and took up the worship of idols.198 Immediately after
describing the corruption of the Jews, the text says that the Witnesses
are the ones–meaning the only ones–now “in a covenant to do the will
of God.”199 The Barnette brief for the Witnesses stated that they have
the same relationship to the flag that Jesus’s apostles had when they
were arrested for their refusal to “‘heil’ or salute Caesar and the Jewish
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clergy.”200 This suggests a resemblance of both Caesar and the Jews to
the Nazis.
The Witnesses purported to know exactly who God is and exactly
how to set up God’s kingdom. Their alternative to “totalitarian” rule was
not democracy; it was “THEOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.” 201
Particularly in the Gobitis brief, Rutherford and Covington addressed
the Court with the presumption that the Court viewed the world through
a Christian lens. “This honorable court takes judicial notice that the
Holy Bible is the authoritative Word or law of Almighty God.” 202 It is
said that Frankfurter was “intensely patriotic,”203 which would explain
why he was not swept away by the analogies the Witnesses posited
between the U.S. and Nazi Germany. However, to reduce his
perspective to patriotism shrinks him by ascribing to him a fixed
identity, when it is evident that he was a believer in pluralism.
B. Frankfurter Ensures a Comprehensive Understanding of
the Issues in Barnette and Gobitis
Frankfurter was skeptical of the far-reaching claims of the
Witnesses, who lacked epistemic self-restraint. The beginning of his
opinion in Gobitis is far more abstract than the personalized opening of
his dissent in Barnette, but equally brilliant. It establishes the same
intellectual high ground, pluralism, as the basis for his argument about
the need for judicial deference to state legislation. The argument he
makes is that there can be no religious freedom without skepticism.
When does the constitutional guarantee compel exemption from
doing what society thinks necessary for the promotion of some great
common end, or from a penalty for conduct which appears
dangerous to the general good? To state the problem is to recall the
truth that no single principle can answer all of life’s complexities.
The right to freedom of religious belief, however dissident and
however obnoxious to the cherished beliefs of others—even of a
majority—is itself the denial of an absolute. But to affirm that the
freedom to follow conscience has itself no limits in the life of a
society would deny that very plurality of principles which, as a
matter of history, underlies protection of religious toleration.204

Frankfurter is saying that if we could determine the nature of
religious truth with absolute certainty, we would dispense with religious
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freedom; we would simply enforce the one true religion. Once we accept
religious freedom, we accept that human judgment is relative. When it
comes to the question of whether the flag salute is educationally
valuable, it is not up to the Court to decide. The Court must apply
skepticism to itself and not consider itself an all-knowing philosopherruler. In educational matters the Court has no expertise.
Frankfurter is not suggesting that the legislature has superior
expertise. Rather, he is asserting that with respect to any topic about
which there is no method for establishing a single truth, the decision
should default to the democratic process. The Court’s role is only to
determine if the legislature has a reasonable–meaning plausible–view of
the matter; for there is no level of truth beyond that.
We are dealing here with the formative period in the development
of citizenship. Great diversity of psychological and ethical opinion
exists among us concerning the best way to train children for their
place in society. Because of these differences and because of
reluctance to permit a single, iron-cast system of education to be
imposed upon a nation compounded of so many strains, we have
held that, even though public education is one of our most cherished
democratic institutions, the Bill of Rights bars a state from
compelling all children to attend the public schools.205

It follows that the Court cannot dictate educational theory to the
public schools. If the mind can seize the truth about what constitutes the
proper form of education, we would have no right to choose whether to
attend private schools. We would establish, as in Plato’s Republic, one
educational system.206 The question as to whether the civic nature of the
ceremony would be disrupted by permitting exemptions must be posed
in the same open-ended epistemic space. Who is to decide, given that
there can be no definitive answer? The states are within their cognitive
rights to consider “that such an exemption might introduce elements of
difficulty into the school discipline, might cast doubts in the minds of
the other children which would themselves weaken the effect of the
exercise.”207
The Witnesses can be required to conform. Frankfurter recognizes
that this entails a loss of autonomy within the context of the ceremony,
but there is no deprivation of liberty. Since the Witnesses are not
compelled to attend the public schools, they are not compelled to salute
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the flag. Moreover, the salute does not cut to the heart of the exercise of
religion. In Barnette, he wrote:
It is not even remotely suggested that the requirement for saluting
the flag involves the slightest restriction against the fullest
opportunity on the part both of the children and of their parents to
disavow as publicly as they choose to do so the meaning that others
attach to the gesture of salute. All channels of affirmative free
expression are open to both children and parents. Had we before us
any act of the state putting the slightest curbs upon such free
expression, I should not lag behind any member of this Court in
striking down such an invasion of the right to freedom of thought
and freedom of speech protected by the Constitution.208

While the iconic words of Jackson in Barnette continue to be
celebrated, one must remember not to minimize the importance of
Frankfurter’s. In exploring the views of Frankfurter, one can
comprehend the contours of the debate over the flag at a much higher
level.
V. CONCLUSION
I have only scratched the surface of Frankfurter’s opinions, but I
have suggested that they rested on a more coherent philosophical
platform than Jackson’s canonized opinion. Jackson simply had
superior rhetorical skills. A separate article would be needed to trace
Frankfurter’s pluralism systematically through his arguments about the
flag salute. But one thing must be noted. Frankfurter did not defend
judicial restraint because he was politically “conservative.” Today,
judicial restraint is often associated with opposition to Roe v. Wade,
which for some conservatives is the preeminent symbol of judicial
activism.209 Yet, for Frankfurter, the symbol of judicial activism was the
activity of the Lochner Court: striking down social legislation protecting
workers from the ravages of unregulated capitalism. In Bunting v.
Oregon, the Court upheld a state law limiting the work day to ten
hours.210 Frankfurter co-authored the brief and argued it in the Supreme
Court.211 The case opened a crack in the Lochner era’s protection of
business interests. Frankfurter was unable to comprehend how Jackson
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could both affirm the primacy of the First Amendment over state
legislation and assert that the property rights of business owners vis-àvis state legislation would not be revivified.212 According to
Frankfurter, the more one elevates free speech to a level of an absolute,
the more one must do the same with the rights of property and contract.
Frankfurter wrote:
Our power does not vary according to the particular provision of the
Bill of Rights which is invoked. The right not to have property taken
without just compensation has, so far as the scope of judicial power
is concerned, the same constitutional dignity as the right to be
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the latter
has no less claim than freedom of the press or freedom of speech or
religious freedom.213

It is worth recalling that Joseph Lochner was a baker who claimed
that he had a right to employ workers for more than ten hours per day,
or sixty hours per week.214 In a recent case, also involving a baker,
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Court
had to find the balance between the baker’s First Amendment rights and
the principle of anti-discrimination as interpreted and applied by a state
civil rights commission.215 The Court decided in favor of the First
Amendment, citing the “fixed star” passage in Barnette.216 The state’s
commitment to equal treatment, which obviously has a constitutional
source in the Fourteenth Amendment, was perfunctorily reduced to an
“orthodoxy” which the baker had a right to find “offensive.” 217 Hence,
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the conflict between two fundamental rights—free speech and
equality—was trivialized.
Frankfurter, I believe, would have recognized the “complexities” of
the Masterpiece Cake case. He also might have suggested that, when it
comes to the excruciatingly difficult matter of weighing First
Amendment rights against the fundamental right not to be discriminated
against, there can be no final answer: the matter should perhaps be left
to the states to resolve. Of course, one can disagree, but my point is that
Masterpiece Cake does not rise to the high level of analysis achieved in
Barnette. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the tension between free speech
and non-discrimination is not adequately dramatized, and the question
of state jurisdiction is hardly addressed.
Frankfurter approached the flag salute issue as requiring inquiry into
“ultimate questions of judicial power in its relation to our scheme of
government.”218 This is missing in some of the cases which
subsequently relied upon Jackson’s “fixed star,” which is a reason to
preserve Frankfurter’s voice in the Great Conversation.
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